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Book Reviews
Movies, Censorship, And The Law. By Ira H. Carman. University
of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor: 1966. Pp. 339, including appen-
dices, table of cases, bibliography and index. $7.95.
Students of constitutional law have long observed that the rulings
of the Supreme Court are significant only to the extent that they are
meaningfully translated at the lowest levels of grass roots administra-
tion. Otherwise, the mandates of the highest court in the land might
just as well be relegated to the stratosphere of judicial abstractions. A
most valuable service has been rendered by political scientists who
have documented the "cultural lag" between the mystique of judicial
pronouncements and the reality of administrative implementation.
Professor Ira H. Carman joins this group in his interesting and pro-
vocative treatment of movie censorship.
A startling revelation of the well-documented interviews con-
tained in Professor Carman's book is the extent to which personalized
and subjective criteria motivate the movie censors in states and locali-
ties requiring prior approval of films. It is not at all unusual for the
censors to deliberately exclude given portions of a film, Roth v. United
States' notwithstanding, because of the presence of nudity, coarse lan-
guage, statements derogatory to the government, or other matters
deemed unfit for presentation to children. Since many hearings are
ex parte, the decisions of the censors are insulated from public pressure
and from the film owner. Because delays in the exhibiting of first-run
films are so costly to the owners, there are few, if any, legal challenges
to censors' rulings and accommodation becomes the prevailing modus
operandi. Professor Carman concludes that motion picture censorship,
wherever it is put into practice, "flouts the supreme law of the land
day after day and year after year."
A basic question is whether prior restraint of films would be
compatible with the guarantee of freedom of expression if in fact the
censors did conform to the rulings of the United States Supreme
Court. Professor Carman believes that the frequency of per curiam
decisions in this area and the wide divergence of views prevailing
among the members of the Court indicate that the Court has a long
way to go before a clear definition of either obscenity or pornography
is established. If the guidelines are unclear to the justices of the
Supreme Court, one would imagine that they would utterly confuse
the members of a censor board. This might well be the case except
for the fact that many of the film censors are completely oblivious
to Court standards.
1. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The Roth case held that the standard for obscenity
is . . whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."
Id. at 489.
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Even if the guidelines for censors' decisions were clearly deline-
ated, the fact remains that censorship hearings are devoid of the
procedural guarantees of due process under which substantive rights
can be asserted. A possible awareness of some of these procedural
shortcomings prompted the Court to recommend a new approach to
be used in censorship hearings. The Court in Kingsley Books, Inc. v.
Brown2 upheld for the first time a "prior" restraint on the sale of
books. The statute approved by the Court in that case allowed a city
attorney to seek an injunction to prevent the dissemination of obscene
materials. A trial was to be granted to the defendant within one day
after the issuance of the injunction and if the materials in question
were found objectionable they would be surrendered to the police or
be destroyed. A similar type of injunctive procedure was recommended
by the Court for movie censorship in Freedman v. Maryland.' On
the basis of the past performance of most censors it would seem that
the inclusion of judges as an integral part of the censorship machinery
must necessarily be an improvement.
Still, this new emphasis on procedural safeguards fails to cope
with the substantive issue of whether it is constitutional to require
movie-makers to obtain official sanction before they can exercise free
expression. Despite the fact that movies have graduated into the
revered category of first amendment freedoms,' they nevertheless
remain distinct from other forms of expression, for which prior sanc-
tion is not permitted, the Kingsley case notwithstanding. Thus a
licensing regulation possesses a chameleon-like quality; although pat-
ently unconstitutional when applied to newspapers, books, political
speeches, or religious sermons, it becomes a constitutionally sanctioned
use of police power when applied to motion pictures.5 The author of
Movies, Censorship, and the Law ends his study with the conclusion
that the Supreme Court has continuously failed to seize the oppor-
tunity to provide the same degree of protection for works of art on
film that is presently accorded written representations.
Despite the significant contributions of Professor Carman's book,
at least a few areas of confusion remain. Is the basic issue merely
that censorship is obnoxious because of its quality of prior restraint,
or would it be equally obnoxious if similar results were obtained from
subsequent restraint? The Court in the Freedman case has come as
close as possible to recasting the principle of prior restraint in the
image of subsequent restraint. There is no doubt that, absent prior
censorship, a minimal guarantee of speech would exist in the form of
the complete and absolute freedom to exhibit any kind of motion pic-
ture at least once. Such a guarantee is certainly more consistent with
the idea that no individual in a free society should have the burden of
proving his right to express himself. Nevertheless, in the long run,
subsequent restraint may sabotage free expression as effectively as
prior restraint if an individual is aware that he will suffer severe
criminal penalties for publishing or exhibiting "obscene" works. The
2. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
n3. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
4. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
5. See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
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more timid movie-makers may even create an extra-legal means of
obtaining prior approval from the authorities and thus effectively
re-establish prior censorship.
A most pertinent question, too, is whether the Court, despite its
failure to define obscenity, has established guidelines for obscenity
which are pointing in the direction of protecting free expression. The
Hicklin doctrine6 has been rejected7 and obscenity is now to be deter-
mined by "the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole."' A
film may be proscribed only when the work goes substantially beyond
the customary limits of candor in describing such matters as sex,
nudity or excretion and is utterly without redeeming social import-
ance.9 Contemporary community standards by which to judge whether
material as a whole appeals to prurient interest seem to be evolv-
ing in terms of national standards rather than provincial community
standards.' Still, I would in the end agree that, "Any test that turns
on what is offensive to the community's standards is too loose, too
capricious, too destructive of freedom of expression to be squared
with the First Amendment.""
Thus we come to the crux of the matter. Is there something so
unique about obscenity that it is sufficient for the Court to take judicial
notice of its dangers? Professor Carman speaks of the need for
establishing ground rules for obscenity and is understandably sympa-
thetic with the need to protect children. However, at the present rate
of development, one may well have to protect the adults from the
children instead of vice-versa. Without meaning to be facetious, how-
ever, this reviewer would point out that freedom for the different
forms of expression, like freedom or equality for persons of different
races, is far too important to be subject to gross discrimination based
on distinctions of dubious scientific validity.
Professor Carman has written a challenging book which hopefully
will help to bring about a very necessary re-examination of the issue
of movie censorship.
Edward Sofen*
Vietnam And International Law: An Analysis Of The Legality Of
The U.S. Military Involvement. By the Consultative Council of
the Lawyers Committee on American Policy Toward Vietnam.
New York: 1967. Pp. 162. $3.75.
The controversy over the American involvement in the Viet-
namese war has reached such a stage of acridity that the lines of
argument in defense of this involvement, as well as those in opposition,
6. See Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
7. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
8. Id. at 489.
9. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964).
10. See Id. at 192-95.
11. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 512 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
* Professor of Government, University of Miami. A.B., 1943, Brooklyn College;
A.M., 1946, Columbia University; Ph.D., 1963, Columbia University.
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have become blurred. The war is either praised or damned in all of
its facets, from the political to the sociological; military, economic,
and moral considerations tend to be mixed into an amalgam to bring
support to the Administration's position or to decry the baseness of
the war effort. While it is true that all these elements - political,
military, economic, social, or moral - play a legitimate role in an
examination of the meaning and nature of the American involvement,
no qualitative differentiation is made between these elements. The
polarization of opinion is so extreme that the war effort is either
supported absolutely or condemned absolutely.
Under these circumstances, serious doubt may be cast upon the
relevance of examining the American involvement purely on its legal
merits. Assuming that the decision to intervene massively with Ameri-
can troops was predicated upon political considerations, such as the
application of the "domino" theory and the policy of containment to
Asian conditions, any legal justification for the intervention would
amount to a superimposition of a pseudo-legality upon a political actu-
ality. Indeed, the Consultative Council of the Lawyers Committee on
American Policy Toward Vietnam published its analysis of the legality
of the war in response to a State Department memorandum entitled:
The Legality of the United States Participation in the Defense of
Viet-Nam, which was published on March 4, 1966,1 more than a year
after the United States became an active participant in the Vietnamese
war, and then only after the legality of United States policy had been
questioned by a private group of American lawyers.
The Consultative Council, composed of eleven noted authorities
on international law and international politics,2 set itself the task of
testing the legal adequacy of the State Department memorandum of
law; its unanimous conclusion was that in all respects, the memo-
randum was grossly inadequate.' The very unanimity of this finding
may be taken as an indication of the fact that the Consultative Council
did not choose to constitute itself so as to provide a broad cross-section
of legal opinion,4 but it does not necessarily impugn the validity of
the Council's conclusions.
The core of the Consultative Council's argument questions the
contention of the State Department that the United States is legiti-
mately engaged in collective self-defense against aggression, as pro-
vided in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. By tracing
the history of the splitting of Vietnam into two zones at the Geneva
Accords of 1954, the Consultative Council insists that this division
1. See also VIm-NAM IN BmR, Department of State Publication 8173 (Decem-
ber, 1966); LZGAL BASIS FOR U.S. MmITARY Am TO SOUTH VIer-NAM, Department
of State Publication 8285 (August, 1967).
2. R.A. Falk, T.H.E. Fried, R.T. Barnet, T.H. Herz, S. Hoffman, W. McClure,
S.H. Mendlovitz, R.S. Miller, H.J. Morgenthau, W.G. Rice, and Q. Wright.
3. Quincy Wright, one of the members of the Consultative Council, came to
similar conclusions earlier in a briefer and far more elegant exposition in Legal
Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 750 (1966).
4. The contrary opinion was expressed in Moore, The Lawfulness of Military
Assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam, 61 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1967). See Under-
wood & Moore, The Lawfulness of United States Assistance to the Republic of
Viet-Nam, 112 CoNG. Rnc. 14943 (1966). See also An, The 1954 Geneva Accords
Revisited, 4 INTRCOLLSGIATF RiV. 7 (1967).
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was created only for a period of two years to separate the combatants
(the French and the Viet-Minh) and to prepare for national elections
in both sections in Vietnam. It is the Council's contention that these
elections were sabotaged by the United States and the puppet govern-
ment of Ngo Dinh Diem, and that as a consequence, the United States
violated the spirit and the letter of the Geneva Accords, to which it
associated itself in 1954. It further contends that the attempt to
freeze the demarcation line between the two zones is in continued
violation of the Accords, that no two sovereign national entities were
created at Geneva and that the United States therefore involved itself
in an internal conflict. The Council denies that the government of
South Vietnam had the legal right to invite the United States to
join in collective self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter because
no overt attack on the part of the North had been proved until after
the American intervention had already taken place, and because South
Vietnam is not a member of the United Nations. It contends that
from 1961 to the present, the United States has violated Articles 2(4)
and 33 (1) of the Charter, which forbid the use of force or the threat
of the use of force and which require the pacific settlement of dis-
putes. It maintains that the air attacks on North Vietnam under-
taken by the United States since February, 1965, constitute illegal
reprisals under the Charter and violate the principle of proportionality
recognized by pre-Charter international law. The Consultative Council
further argues that the United States has violated Article 53 of the
Charter by not adhering to its regional defense agreements as required
by the SEATO Treaty. Finally, it contends that the American inter-
vention in Vietnam violates the provisions of the United States Con-
stitution, which recognizes the binding quality of treaties and the
supremacy of international law.
Although the cumulative effect of this work is to strip the State
Department's memorandum of law of any respectability, to a large
extent, this critique rests on a very narrow definition of the meaning
of Article 51 of the Charter and on a somewhat tenuous claim that
the South Vietnamese Republic is not technically an independent state.
Furthermore, the Consultative Council readily admits that the Ho Chi
Minh government has been equally guilty of violating the Geneva
Accords of 1954, thus casting doubt on the extent to which the United
States was obligated to abide by their provisions, particularly if the
principle of the clausula rebus sic stantibus5 were invoked.
To a large extent, this attack on the State Department memo-
randum reinforces a long-held impression of this reviewer that while
such legal justifications are fair game to anyone who wishes to de-
molish them, the task of doing so is too easy, and it is not sporting
to take full advantage of one's opportunities. If it is understood that
the memorandum is a legal super imposition on a hard political reality,
then its built-in weaknesses become readily apparent. The Consulta-
5. 'A name given to a tacit condition, said to attach to all treaties, that they
shall cease to be obligatory so soon as the state of facts and conditions upon which
they were founded has substantially changed." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1432 (4th
ed. 1957).
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tive Council, in the last paragraph of its analysis, implicitly recognizes
that the problem of Vietnam can only be resolved on the basis of
national interest: "It is our belief that a conscientious and impartial
re-examination will establish the illegality of the current United States
position . . . and that it will further reveal that it is in the short-term
and long-term interest of the United States to bring these policies into
conformity with international law."6
Eric A. Belgrad*
6. CONSULTATnrM COUNCIL Olt THS LAWYaS CoMmirT ON AmZBCAN POLICY
TowARw V=rNAm, VIETNAm & INTRNATiONAL LAW: AN ANALYsIs OP TH LsoALiry
OP THS U.S. MILITARY INVOLVsMENT at 86 (1967).
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Towson State College, Baltimore,
Maryland. A.B., 1958, Johns Hopkins University; M.A., 1965, Johns Hopkins
University.
.BOOKS RECEIVED
BENCHMARKS. By Henry J. Friendly. University of Chicago Press
(1967).
LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA. By Geoffrey C. Hazzard, Jr. Pren-
tice-Hall, Inc. (1968).
THE POLITICS AND DYNAMICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. By Moses
Moskowitz. Oceana Publications (1968).
PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL TAX CONTROVERSIES. By Marvin J. Garbis
& Robert L. Frome. The Ronald Press Co. (1968).
READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY. By Richard C. Allen, Elyce Z.
Feister & Jesse G. Rubin. Johns Hopkins Press (1968).
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PERSONAL HISTORY IN PSYCHIATRY AND
PSYCHOANALYSIS By Samuel Novey. Johns Hopkins Press (1968).
THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE LAW. By Manfred S. Guttmacher.
Charles C. Thomas (1968).
THE WARREN COURT AND ITS CRITICS. By Clifford M. Lytle.
University of Arizona Press (1968).
